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A REVIEW OF RECENT DERIVATIVES
LITIGATION
John D. Finnerty*
Kishlaya Pathak†

I. INTRODUCTION
The global over-the-counter derivatives market exceeded $33
trillion of gross market value as of year-end 2008, according to the Bank
for International Settlements. 1 Recent headlines suggest that derivatives
– specifically, credit default swaps – pose an enormous potential
systemic risk and that they are one of the root causes of the current
economic crisis. 2 Warren Buffett, who leads a conglomerate—
Berkshire Hathaway—which held $63 billion of derivatives as of April
* Professor of Finance, Fordham University and Managing Principal, Finnerty
Economic Consulting, LLC (finnerty@fordham.edu and finnerty@finnecon.com).
B.A., Williams College; B.A., M.A., Cambridge University (Marshall Scholar); Ph.D.,
Naval Postgraduate School. I gratefully acknowledge Eric Borun and Sherry Chen for
outstanding research assistance.
† Fixed Income Strategist, Barclays Capital (kishlaya.pathak@barclayscapital.com).
B.A. Honors Economics, University of Delhi; M.A. Economics, University of Delhi;
MBA, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. I gratefully
acknowledge Eric Borun and Sherry Chen for outstanding research assistance. This
article was written while I was at Finnerty Economic Consulting and reflects my views
and not those of Barclays Capital..
1. See Mark Brown, OTC Derivatives Volume Fell, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2009, at
C5. Gross market value is the cost of replacing existing OTC derivatives contracts.
Market size is often stated in terms of notional value, but gross market value is a better
measure of the level of risk in the derivatives market. The size of the market is as of
December 31, 2008. Gross market value rose 66.5% in the second half of 2008 even
though aggregate notional amount fell 13.4% (to $592 trillion from $684 trillion).
2. For example, the obligations associated with credit default swaps and other
derivative positions that were not fully hedged have been held responsible for American
International Group’s financial distress. See Liam Pleven & Randall Smith, Action on
AIG Unit May Cost Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at C1.
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2010, has warned, “Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction.” 3 This remark suggests that these instruments should carry the
warning,
“Improper use can be hazardous to your financial health.” Mounting
concerns over derivatives have recently led the U.S. Treasury to propose
a comprehensive regulatory framework to bring greater transparency to
the derivatives market, restrict derivatives trading, and impose closer
supervision on derivatives market participants to reduce systemic risk. 4
Importantly, the proposals call for amending the Commodity Exchange
Act and the securities laws to “prevent market manipulation, fraud, and
other market abuses.” 5
Derivatives, when used properly, improve economic efficiency and
allow companies to manage unwanted risk exposures. Allegations of
derivatives abuse in recent litigation provide a stern reminder that
substantial damage can occur when they are misapplied.6 A review of
court records highlights how important it is for market participants to
understand these instruments before using them. Court records reveal
that the complexity of derivatives often leads to misunderstandings and
is sometimes exploited by unscrupulous financial promoters to take
unfair advantage of unsophisticated or unsuspecting investors. The
apparent investor acceptance of Bernard Madoff’s purported ‘splitstrike’ strategy—in which the execution of stock call and put options
supposedly enabled the fund to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns—
3.
Annual Letter to Shareholders from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., Feb. 21, 2003, at 15, available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf.
But see Damien Paletta,
Democrats Deny Buffett on a Key Provision, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010 (stating
Buffett’s “Berkshire [Hathaway] has $63 billion in derivatives contracts, and Mr.
Buffett has boasted he holds very little collateral against these products”).
4. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Regulatory Reform Over-the-Counter
(OTC) Derivatives (May 13, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg129.htm;
see also Sarah N. Lynch & Serena Ng, U.S. Moves to Regulate Derivatives Trade,
WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at C1, C3. The regulatory proposals would require
standardized OTC derivatives to be traded on regulated exchanges or electronic trading
platforms and cleared through regulated centralized clearinghouses, impose greater
record-keeping and trade reporting requirements on derivatives dealings, increase
regulatory oversight of derivatives dealers with large counterparty exposures, and give
regulators authority to establish limits on derivatives positions to control risk.
5. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 4.
6. The article updates an earlier article by one of the co-authors. See John D.
Finnerty & Mark S. Brown, An Overview of Derivatives Litigation, 1994 to 2000, 7
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 131 (2001).
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is a case in point. 7
Derivatives are financial instruments whose value depends on the
value of some underlying asset price, reference rate, or index. 8 They
have been written on commodities, currencies, stocks, bonds, interest
rates, credit spreads, assorted indexes, and other quantities. Both
individuals and financial institutions use derivatives. They allow
investors to assume or offload selected risks. The application of
derivatives can range from outright, and perfectly legal, speculation to
hedging. At the most basic level, derivatives channel risks from hedgers
who wish to avoid them to speculators who are willing to bear them for
a price. 9 Securities dealers have used financial derivatives to craft
synthetic financial instruments which mimic the returns of investing in a
particular asset without purchasing it. Synthetic derivatives are
attractive when the market for the asset is illiquid and investing in it
would, therefore, be very risky. Due to a combination of market
volatility being magnified by the financial leverage inherent in
derivative instruments, the increasing complexity of the newer
derivative instruments, and the lack of sophistication on the part of many
derivatives buyers and sellers, many derivatives users have failed to
realize their goals. In some cases, investors have suffered large losses
and have resorted to litigation to try to recoup these losses. 10
This article describes derivatives, briefly explains how they can be
used to improve market efficiency, and provides an overview of
derivatives lawsuits filed, and regulatory enforcement actions taken, in
the United States between 2001 and 2009. It classifies cases by type and
number for each type of derivative instrument and summarizes the
dominant trends. It also discusses several cases which highlight
important legal and financial issues raised by recent derivatives
7. Carole Bernard & Phelim Boyle, Mr. Madoff’s Amazing Returns: An Analysis of
the Split-Strike Conversion Strategy, 2 (U. of Waterloo Working Paper, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371320.
8. JOHN D. FINNERTY, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS CREDIT DERIVATIVES
PRIMER 3 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York 1998) [hereinafter FINNERTY PWC
1998].
9. A derivative transaction can also enable both parties to hedge their respective
risk exposures, as for example, when a farm cooperative enters into a corn forward
contract with a food processing firm calling for the future delivery of a stated number of
bushels of corn at a specific price per bushel. Both the cooperative and the firm can
benefit from the consequent reduction in their exposure to corn price risk.
10. John D. Finnerty & Mark S. Brown, An Overview of Derivatives Litigation,
1994 to 2000, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 131, 132 (2001).
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litigation.

II. DESCRIPTION OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
This section provides a brief description of the derivative
instruments 11 covered in the rest of the article. It briefly explains how
they can be used to improve market efficiency and also how they have
been misused at times, which has led to litigation. It is important to
appreciate that while derivative instruments may be used to reallocate
risk between parties, they do not make risk go away. One party to a
derivatives contract reduces (or hedges) its risk exposure by transferring
it to the counterparty, who is presumably better able to manage this risk
or is willing to bear it at lower cost than the party who transferred it.
But the counterparty, to whom the risk is transferred, must figure out
how to deal with it. 12
A. FORWARD CONTRACT
A forward contract 13 obligates the holder to buy a specified amount
of a particular asset at a stated price on a particular date in the future.
All these terms are fixed at the time the parties enter into the forward
contract. The specified future price is called the exercise price. Fixing
the exercise price eliminates each counterparty’s unwanted price risk
exposure. Forward contracts were written on commodities as early as
the 1840s. 14 Most forward contracts are for commodities or currencies.
Forward contracts are customized and are traded over-the-counter.
11. FINNERTY PWC 1998, supra note 8; see also JOHN FINNERTY, STRUCTURING
INSTRUMENTS TO ADJUST RISK EXPOSURE: THE ARITHMETIC OF FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS 2 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York 1999) [hereinafter FINNERTY
PWC 1999].
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. In the example discussed in footnote
9, where both parties to the derivative contract reduce their risk exposure, each party
transfers unwanted risk to its counterparty. The farm cooperative transfers the risk of
an unwanted decrease in the price it will receive for its corn, and the food processor
transfers the risk of an unwanted increase in the price it will pay for the corn. The farm
cooperative also forgoes the benefit of a price increase, and the food processor also
forgoes the benefit of a price decrease as the price they pay for transferring the
unwanted risk to the other party.
13. FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11, at 2.
14. Id.
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Customization enables them to be tailored to better suit the needs of the
two counterparties.
Forward contracts are useful in eliminating price uncertainty
because the two parties agree on the price at which the asset will change
hands when the contract matures. If the market price at the time the
contract matures is higher than the exercise price, then the buyer of the
forward contract will realize a profit. But if the market price is less than
the exercise price, then the buyer will realize a loss, as illustrated in
Exhibit 1. The seller is in exactly the opposite position, realizing a
profit when the market price is less than the exercise price and a loss
when the market price exceeds the exercise price.
Exhibit 1
Payoff Profile of a Forward Contract

B. FUTURES CONTRACT
A futures contract 15 is just like a forward contract except that it is a
standardized, exchange-traded instrument. Futures contracts were
15. Id. at 3.
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developed in the 1860s to deal with the default risk inherent in forward
contracts. 16 When the buyer or the seller under a forward contract faced
a large potential loss, that party had an incentive not to perform and in
many cases reneged on its obligation. To avoid this problem, trades
involving futures contracts are settled through a clearinghouse, which
guarantees the performance of the buyer and the seller who are the
parties to each futures contract. The clearinghouse stands between the
buyer and the seller as soon as the futures contract is entered into. The
clearinghouse marks each party’s position to market each day and
requires the party with a loss to post sufficient collateral to guarantee its
ability to settle the contract. Thus, unlike forward contracts, the gains
and losses on futures contracts are realized daily. 17
The payoff diagram for a futures contract looks just like the payoff
diagram for a forward contract in Exhibit 1. Futures contracts have the
advantages of being exchange-traded, which makes them more liquid
than otherwise similar forward contracts. They are also free of default
risk. Standardization means that there are usually well-accepted
valuation models available for valuing standard contracts, which lessens
the likelihood of valuation disputes. However, their standardization can
limit their usefulness; as the parties will have to design a forward
contract when they desire special features that are not available in the
existing futures contracts.
The issue of whether a particular contract is a futures contract, a
forward contract, or some other type of contract has arisen in disputes,
such as Olympic Natural Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.,
which is discussed later in the article. 18
C. OPTION CONTRACTS
An option contract 19 gives its holder the right (but not the
obligation) to purchase or sell a specified underlying asset at a stated
price (the exercise price or strike price) on or before a specified
expiration date. A call option conveys the right to buy the specified
16. Id. at 2.
17. For similar reasons, the U.S. Treasury has proposed the establishment of a
centralized clearinghouse to clear all credit default swap transactions. See U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, supra note 4.
18. 294 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2002).
19. FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11, at 4.
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asset, and a put option conveys the right to sell the underlying asset. For
example, a call option might give the holder the right to buy 100 shares
of Exxon Mobil common stock at a price of $40 per share anytime
within the next six months. The holder will exercise the call option so
long as the market price exceeds the specified strike price on the
exercise date, in this case $40 at the end of six months, and the holder of
a put option will exercise when the strike price exceeds the market price
on the exercise date. In either case, the option is said to be in-themoney. Conversely, an option is said to be out-of-the-money, when
immediate exercise would not be profitable, and if the option has
reached expiration, the holder will let it expire worthless.
Exhibit 2 illustrates the payoffs on call options and put options.
When a market participant buys a call option, she receives a higher
payoff on the exercise date the greater is the excess of the market price
of the underlying asset above the exercise price . If the market price is
below the exercise price on the exercise date, then the payoff is zero.
When a market participant buys a put option, she receives a higher
payoff on the exercise date the greater is the excess of the exercise price
above the market price of the underlying asset. If the market price is
above the exercise price on the exercise date, then the payoff is zero.
Exhibit 2 illustrates the option payoffs just before the options are
set to expire. This value is referred to as an option’s intrinsic value.
Importantly, options also have a time value before they expire because
changes in the underlying asset price before expiration could increase
the expected payoff by rising (for a call option) or falling (for a put
option). The remaining time value is greater the longer is the option’s
remaining time to expiration because the greater time to expiration
allows for larger possible favorable price movements.
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Exhibit 2
Option Payoff Profiles

Call options are attractive to investors who expect the price of the
underlying asset to rise. They pay a relatively small option premium to
obtain the opportunity for a large potential gain depending on whether
and how high the price of the underlying asset rises. This large potential
for gain in relation to the price paid for the option is referred to as the
leverage provided by the option.
A put option is attractive to investors who expect the price of an
asset to fall. The put option provides a form of insurance because the
holder will realize at least this price no matter how low the price of the
underlying asset falls. One can think of conventional auto insurance as a
form of put option: the car owner can put/sell what is left of her car to
the insurer in return for the insured amount if the car is destroyed in an
accident. 20
20. Id.
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Warrants are call options that a firm issues. These options are
exercisable for the firm’s own common shares. Warrants are at the
center of R.A. Mackie & Co. v. PetroCorp Inc., in which it was alleged
that an acquiring firm forced the premature exercise of the acquired
firm’s outstanding warrants and thereby deprived the warrant holders of
the warrants’ remaining time value. 21
Employee stock options (ESOs) are call options that a firm writes
on shares of its common stock, and issues to its employees. 22 Firms
usually set the strike price equal to the market price of the firm’s stock
on the grant date. By selecting an earlier date on which the stock price
was lower and treating that date as the grant date, a firm’s executives
convert an at-the-money call option into an in-the-money call option.
Backdating increases the ESOs’ value and benefits the employee at the
expense of the firm. The scandal surrounding employee stock option
backdating arose because the executives of hundreds of firms backdated
their ESOs but concealed the backdating from their firms’
shareholders. 23
A call option and a put option can be combined to create what is
known as a collar. For example, an investor who owns common shares
can buy a put option to limit her downside risk to the strike price of the
put option. She can sell a call option to pay for part of the cost of the
put option. If the price of the call option equals the cost of the put
option, the collar is called a zero-cost collar. The strike price of the call
is higher than the strike price of the put. The investor gives up any
appreciation above this strike price because the purchaser of the call
option will exercise the call when the share price exceeds this
threshold. 24
Securities fraud often involves options. They are difficult to value
because of their complexity. Most options trade in the over-the-counter
market, rather than on an exchange. The lack of market prices makes it
difficult to determine what they are worth. They employ leverage
because the option premium is only a fraction of the price of the
21. 329 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
22. John D. Finnerty, Extending the Black-Scholes-Merton Model to Value
Employee Stock Options, 15 J. APPLIED FIN. 25, 25 (2005).
23. J.M. Bickley & G. Shorter. (2008). Stock Options: The Backdating Issue
(RL33926). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/504/.
24. The Madoff Ponzi scheme involved an investment strategy that supposedly
incorporated collars using S&P 100 Index put and call options. Bernard & Boyle, supra
note 7, at 2. The scheme is described later in this article.
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underlying instrument. Because of this leverage, options magnify the
potential gain as compared to a direct investment in the underlying, but
they also magnify the potential for loss because the entire investment in
the option will be lost if it expires out-of-the-money.
The potential for large gains, complexity, and lack of market prices
can attract disreputable promoters who offer investors structured
investments that incorporate a complex option which seem to offer large
potential returns. Fraud occurs when this investment is intentionally
overpriced or its riskiness is misrepresented.
Options have also been involved in a number of tax shelter cases. 25
In many such cases, the potentially large payoffs on the options were
neutralized by buying and simultaneously selling nearly identical call
options that had only a very small difference in their strike prices.
D. SWAP CONTRACTS 26
The two parties to a swap agreement exchange payment obligations
tied to specified interest rates, exchange rates, asset prices, or indexes.
Swaps are of several types - interest rate swaps and currency swaps
being the most common. In a “plain vanilla” interest rate swap, two
counterparties exchange interest payment obligations, with one agreeing
to pay a fixed interest rate and the other a floating interest rate based on
a stated notional principal amount. The floating rate is usually based on
one of the London Interbank Offer Rates (LIBOR). 27 Principal is not
exchanged, and the interest amounts due on each payment date are
netted, which reduces default risk. Interest rate swaps have been the
central issue in many cases, including Lehman Brothers Commercial
Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co.28
and In re Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., 29 which are discussed lat25. See, e.g., Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 412 F. Supp. 2d 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
26. FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11.
27. LIBOR are interest rates that are determined in the money market. Dollar and
sterling LIBOR are determined in the London money market. They are the interest
rates at which major banks lend one another funds denominated in a particular currency.
LIBOR are quoted for various tenors, such overnight, one week, one month, three
months, six months, and so on. Three-month LIBOR is most common in bank loans
and interest rate swaps with payments made quarterly.
28. 179 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
29. 399 B.R. 1, 4-5 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008).
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er in the article.
In a “plain vanilla” currency swap, the cash flows are denominated
in two different currencies. In effect, the two counterparties extend one
another back-to-back loans, which are consolidated into a single
transaction. 30 An asset swap involves an obligation to pay interest based
on a specified fixed or floating interest rate in return for an obligation
representing the total return on a specified reference asset or index.
Interest rate swaps are useful for hedging interest rate risk. 31 For
example, suppose a corporation has floating rate debt outstanding but
the treasurer is concerned that interest rates are quite likely to rise. She
can have the corporation enter into a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap
by agreeing to pay a stated fixed rate and to receive in return a series of
payments based on a specified floating interest rate, as illustrated in
Exhibit 3. The floating interest rate payments in the swap will fully
offset the floating interest rate payments on the bank loan when the swap
floating rate and the bank loan interest rate float off the same index. The
corporation is left paying the fixed rate. Similarly, suppose an investor
owns a fixed rate bond, expects interest rates to increase, but does not
want to sell the bond. She can enter into a swap, agreeing to pay fixed
rates in return for receiving floating rates in order to take advantage of
the expected increase in interest rates. 32

30. Back-to-back loans (or parallel loans), which were developed in the 1960s,
were the precursor to interest rate swaps. Financial engineers realized that the two
back-to-back loans could be collapsed into a single instrument and given other desirable
features, such as netting of periodic payments and basing the periodic payments on
notional amounts, rather than exchanging principal, to reduce default risk.
31. FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11.
32. This is the opposite of the payment pattern illustrated in Exhibit 3. Put
somewhat differently, the counterparty to the corporation in the fixed-for-floating
interest rate swap discussed earlier in the paragraph agrees to pay the stated floating rate
and to receive in return a series of payments based on the stated fixed interest rate.
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Exhibit 3
Cash Flows of a Pay-Fixed Interest Rate Swap

Asset swaps are similar to interest rate swaps except that one of the
payment streams is based on the total return on a specified asset. The
asset swap is referred to as an equity swap when the specified asset is a
stated number of shares of a particular firm’s common stock. Total
return is calculated as current payments, e.g., dividends, plus
appreciation or minus depreciation in the market value of the underlying
asset. 33 Asset swaps create the economic equivalent of borrowing funds
to buy the asset, which is in effect, conveying ownership of a synthetic
asset. Synthetic assets are attractive to investors who want to “own” the
asset but either do not want to take physical possession of it or believe
that their trading will have a large enough market impact that it will
affect the price of the asset to their disadvantage.
Equity swaps are like interest rate swaps except that the total return
on a specified equity instrument replaces the fixed interest rate payments
as one leg of the swap. The floating rate leg, which is usually based on
one of the LIBOR rates, remains the same. In a typical equity swap, the
initial value of the equity instrument is the notional amount of the swap
on which the periodic interest payments are calculated. The equity
payment receiver receives cash dividends and any increase in the value
of the equity instrument during the period but pays the counterparty the
amount of any decrease in equity value during the period. 34 For
example, if an investor wishes to realize the total return on 10,000 shares
of a particular stock that is selling for $30 per share, the investor can
engage in a swap synthetically representing an underlying amounting to
10,000 shares of the stock. The notional principal is $300,000. The
33. The total return receiver receives the periodic appreciation, e.g., the increase in
the value of the shares, from the counterparty and pays the periodic depreciation, e.g.,
the decrease in the value of the shares, to the counterparty.
34. See Note, Tax-Exempt Entities, Notional Principal Contracts, and the
Unrelated Business Income Tax, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (1992).
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investor would make quarterly payments to the counterparty on the
$300,000 notional principal at 3-month LIBOR. If the price of the stock
fell $5 during the quarter, the investor would pay the counterparty
$50,000, and if it rose $5, the counterparty would pay her $50,000. If
the stock paid a $1 cash dividend during the quarter, the counterparty
would pay her $10,000. Equity swaps were at the center of Caiola v.
Citibank, which is discussed later in the article. 35
E. THE FOUR BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS
Forward contracts, futures contracts, options, and swaps have been
referred to as the four basic building blocks of derivative instruments.36
They have the distinctive payment patterns described in the preceding
paragraphs. The payment characteristics of these instruments are more
closely related than might appear at first glance. A clever derivatives
trader can use different derivative instruments almost interchangeably to
achieve any particular payoff pattern. 37 The trader might do this because of a tax or regulatory advantage of one structure over another or to
game the accounting regulations and achieve a more desired accounting
treatment. 38 Exhibit 4 illustrates the relationship among the basic
building blocks.

35. 295 F.3d 312, 316-17 (2d Cir. 2002).
36. Charles W. Smithson, Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & D. Sykes Wilford, MANAGING
FINANCIAL RISK: A GUIDE TO DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND
VALUE MAXIMIZATION 42 (Irwin 1995).
37. Id. at 41.
38. At one time, swaps were especially popular because of a quirk in the accounting rules. “Swap contracts” could be kept off the firm’s balance sheet so long as the
value of the swap at initiation was zero, as was usually the case. This led to accounting
abuses that eventually resulted in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 133
(“FAS 133”). FAS 133 transformed the accounting for derivatives from a regime based
largely on the form of the transaction to one based on the derivative instrument’s true
economic character.
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Exhibit 4
Relationships Among the Four Basic Building Blocks

The basic building blocks are used by derivatives dealers to craft
more complex financial instruments that have more desirable payment
patterns. The basic building blocks can be combined with conventional
bonds to create new securities. 39 For example, combining a fixed-rate
bond and an interest rate swap that pays fixed rates and receives floating
rates creates what is known as an inverse floating rate note. 40
The basic building blocks are also useful in analyzing complex
contingent claims. Such instruments typically incorporate one or more
of the basic building blocks. By comparing the payoffs of the complex
contingent claim in different economic scenarios to the distinctive
signatures of the basic building blocks, it is usually possible to reverse
engineer the contingent claim and break it down into its constituent
parts.
This process in turn aids in understanding how the instrument
39. FINNERTY PWC 1999, supra note 11.
40. See id. For example, combining an 8% bond and an interest rate swap that
pays 7% and receives LIBOR creates a note that pays 15% - LIBOR. LIBOR is the
London Inter Bank Offer Rate, which is the interest rate at which banks lend each other
funds in the London money market. Some investors find such bonds attractive because
the coupon varies inversely with interest rates, which causes the bonds to exhibit
heightened interest rate sensitivity (duration).
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works and suggests how to value it and how to hedge the risks inherent
in it. For example, a callable corporate bond is a straight bond plus a
bond call option. As a second example, a convertible bond is a straight
bond plus the (conversion) option to exchange it for a stated number of
shares of the bond issuer’s common stock.
F. SYNTHETIC SECURITIES
A synthetic security is a contractual agreement between two parties,
usually an investor and a financial institution, which is designed to
replicate the total investment return of a particular physical security,
such as share of common stock or a call option. For example, an equity
swap provides the equity payment receiver with the same stream of
returns she would receive if she owned the underlying common shares
directly, and is therefore a synthetic share. The aggregate market value
of the underlying asset at the inception of the synthetic transaction is the
notional amount, and the investor is charged interest on this notional
amount. Thus, the synthetic security represents a leveraged investment
in the underlying physical security.
Trading in synthetic securities can be cheaper or less risky than
trading the physical securities when the latter are thinly traded or
maintaining open positions in them is expensive. Synthetic trading often
avoids the need to post large amounts of margin capital and permits
large positions to be opened and closed quickly with less market impact.
Caiola v. Citibank, which is discussed later in the article, concerns a
situation where an investor traded enormous numbers of shares and
options on a particular stock, and synthetic transactions offered several
advantages over physical transactions. 41 The advantages of synthetic
equity transactions over physical transactions in avoiding the necessity
of posting large amounts of margin, allowing positions to be established
and unwound quickly, and permitting the effective purchase of large
amounts of stock without affecting the market price were a central issue
in Caiola v. Citibank. 42 However, the economic equivalence of
synthetic and real assets can become problematic, as illustrated by CSX
v. Children’s Investment Fund Management, when circumstances cause
the synthetic asset to convey beneficial (legal) ownership of the
underlying asset. 43 This case is discussed later in the article.
41. 295 F.3d at 312.
42. Id. at 316.
43. 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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G. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
A credit default swap 44 (“CDS”) promises to make a specified
payment in the event a particular debt instrument experiences an event
of default, such as a payment default or if the issuer files for bankruptcy
protection. For example, a General Motors CDS might promise to pay
the difference between the face amount and the market price of a
particular GM bond if GM defaults on its debt. A CDS functions like a
letter of credit, which is typically issued by a bank, or a surety bond,
which is typically issued by an insurance company. 45
A CDS is a form of insurance. 46 It enables the CDS buyer to insure
against an event of default or some other specified credit event involving
the specified underlying financial instrument. It requires a single
upfront payment, or possibly a series of payments, in exchange for the
counterparty’s obligation to make an insurance payment that is
contingent upon the occurrence of any one of a specified set of possible
credit events. This payment structure is illustrated in Exhibit 5. The
insurer is exposed to the risk of default because it must pay off on the
contract when a credit event occurs. When the CDS seller fails to
reinsure this risk by entering into offsetting CDS or buying conventional
reinsurance, it is exposed to a potentially large loss.
Exhibit 5
The Basic Structure of a Credit Default Swap

American International Group’s financial distress has been
attributed in part to the large amount of CDS contracts it apparently
wrote on collateralized debt obligations, which were only partially
44. FINNERTY PWC 1998, supra note 8, at 15.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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hedged, thus leaving it with a large net default risk exposure when this
market collapsed in 2008. 47
CDS contracts have been the subject of several lawsuits, for
example, concerning whether an event of default has occurred. 48 They
are likely to give rise to additional litigation because of the recent
financial crisis. The Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Cooperative v.
John Hancock Life Insurance Company 49 and Merrill Lynch v. XL
Capital Assurance 50 discussed later in the article, are but two recent
examples.
H. COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS
A collateralized debt obligation 51 (“CDO”) is an asset-backed
security that is backed either by bonds (collateralized bond obligation, or
“CBO”) or bank loans (collateralized loan obligation, or “CLO”) or a
combination of the two. A portfolio of fixed income assets is pooled
and contributed to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”), which is a
separate legal entity, such as a trust. The trust issues multiple classes of
debt instruments and at least one equity class. The pool of assets serves
as collateral and the main source of cash flow for the several classes of
debt securities the SPV issues. These CDO classes are prioritized as to
their right to receive the cash flow from the underlying fixed income
portfolio. This prioritization reallocates the default risk, or credit risk,
on the underlying portfolio so that the most senior CDO class, which
47. Plevin & Smith, supra note 2, at C1.
48. See, e.g., AON Fin. Prods. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 92-93 (2d Cir.
2007). In AON, plaintiffs brought suit for alleged breach of contract related to a credit
default swap agreement between the parties. Plaintiffs asserted that a "credit event"
occurred when a Philippine government agency defaulted on a surety bond. Defendant
argued that the agency was not included in the definition of "Republic of Philippines,"
the reference entity of the parties' contract, and thus, the default was not a credit event.
The number of disputes concerning whether an event of default has occurred
diminished after the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) published a
standard definition of "events of default." See ISDA, 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions 1, Exhibit A, at 61 (2003).
49. Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582
F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009).
50. Merrill Lynch Int'l v. XL Capital Assurance Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298, 299-300
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
51. John D. Finnerty, Securities Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCE: FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS, vol. I, ch. 7, 61 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 2008).
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was often rated triple-A or double-A, has the least exposure to defaults
on the underlying portfolio, and the most junior CDO class, which is an
unrated equity class, has the greatest exposure. 52
Exhibit 6 illustrates a typical cash flow CDO structure, which
contains bonds, bank loans, or some combination of the two. 53 The
senior tranche has the lowest exposure to default risk on the underlying
collateral, and the equity class has the greatest exposure. Even the
senior-most class can experience losses if the default rates on the
underlying collateral are high enough and the junior tranches are not
large enough to absorb fully the entire losses due to these defaults.
Exhibit 6
Illustration of a Cash Flow CDO Structure

A series of cash allocation rules specify how to distribute the cash
flows obtained from the underlying portfolio on each payment date
among the various CDO classes/tranches of bonds with differing risk
characteristics. The CDO collateral can range from high-yield bonds to
52. Hundreds of triple-A-rated senior classes were downgraded in 2008 as the
rating agencies began to realize that the underlying collateral was experiencing much
higher default rates than had previously been expected.
53. Synthetic CDOs contain credit default swaps and other financial instruments
that synthetically replicate a portfolio of bonds and bank loans.
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emerging market debt to corporate loans to mortgages.
The
methodology designed to channel cash flows depends upon the nature of
the risk of the collateral and investor preferences. For instance, in the
case of agency mortgages, prepayment and the consequent shortening of
duration is the key issue. However, investors such as pension funds
prefer long duration assets from the perspective of asset-liability
management. Therefore, the structuring exercise focuses on designing
different classes of derivative instruments that match the tolerances of
investors for differing exposures to prepayment risk and to default risk.
Similarly, certain investors are not permitted to purchase bonds that are
rated below investment-grade. 54 In this case, the cash flow allocation
rules prioritize the distribution of the cash flows, which can create one
or more classes of higher-grade bonds from lower-grade collateral by
reallocating the default risk appropriately.
It is important to appreciate that default risk is not eliminated; it is
simply reallocated among the classes of derivative securities issued by
the SPV. The senior SPV classes have less default risk than the
underlying pool of assets, but the more junior SPV classes have more
default risk. The most junior classes (subordinated and equity classes in
Exhibit 6) bear disproportionately large default risk. If the underlying
pool of assets has a high level of default risk, for example, because it
contains subprime mortgages, then the opportunities for risk reallocation
are consequently more limited, and recent experience indicates that even
the senior-most SPV classes are likely to have a high degree of default
risk.
CDOs have been at the heart of a number of disputes. Many CDOs
have experienced unexpectedly high default rates, which have led to
litigation. For example, Metropolitan West Asset Management v.
Shenkman Capital Management, which is discussed later in the article,
concerns a dispute over the liquidation of a CDO’s collateral, which had
fallen in value in response to the higher default rates to the point where
the indenture gave the senior note holders the right to direct the trustee
to liquidate the collateral. 55 CDO tranches are often insured by financial
insurers, and problems with these insurance arrangements have triggered
litigation. For example, Merrill Lynch v. XL Capital Assurance, which
54. Bond ratings fall into several categories. The ratings from highest to lowest,
according to Moody’s Investors Service, are Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C, and D.
Baa and above are investment-grade, and Ba and below are speculative-grade.
55. No. 03 Civ. 5539 (NRB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17003, at *1-5 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 16, 2005).
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is discussed later in the article, is an example of a case involving CDOs
and CDS contracts referenced to one or more of the CDO tranches that a
securities dealer had purchased to hedge the default risk inherent in
various CDO tranches it was holding. 56
Many very complex CDOs, and in particular CDOs structured
around subprime mortgage collateral, experienced large losses during
2007 and 2008, which triggered lawsuits seeking recovery of investor
losses asserting fraud and other allegations.

III. OVERVIEW OF DERIVATIVES LITIGATION BASED ON
THE TYPE OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS INVOLVED
This section provides an overview of federal derivatives litigation
since 2001. We furnish a breakdown of the litigation between
enforcement actions and court cases and also by type of derivative
instrument and by type of underlying asset. We also provide a brief
description of some representative cases to highlight the major legal and
financial issues raised by derivatives litigation.
A. FREQUENCY OF LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Exhibit 7 provides an annual breakdown of federal enforcement
actions and litigation in the federal courts relating to derivatives between
2001 and 2009. The enforcement actions consist of cases initiated by
regulatory agencies, such as the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (the “CFTC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the “SEC”), the Department of Labor (the “DOL”), and the Justice
Department. The federal litigation consists mainly of cases initiated by
private litigants.

56. 564 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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Exhibit 7
Annual Breakdown of Litigation and Enforcement Actions

Year

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

Enforcement
Action

2

6

5

6

7

21

15

15

13

90

Other

11

12

8

8

13

27

12

19

38

148

Total

13

18

13

14

20

48

27

34

51

238

A total of 238 derivatives-related cases consisting of ninety
enforcement actions and 148 private cases were filed in the U.S. courts
between 2001 and 2009. Enforcement actions averaged ten per year
from 2001 to 2009. The number increased significantly in 2006 to peak
at twenty-one, from a yearly mean of about five between 2001 and 2005.
Private causes of action exhibit a similar pattern until 2006, cresting at
twenty-seven that year, falling to just twelve in 2007, but then rising
steadily thereafter and reaching thirty-eight in 2009. In 2006, the
greatest number of cases involved options on currencies or options on
commodities, with the plaintiffs typically alleging fraud or breach of
contract. More recently, the greatest number of cases still involves
options on currencies or commodities. However, cases involving
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations increased
dramatically in 2009 as a result of the mortgage-backed and
asset-backed securities market meltdowns beginning in 2007.
B. BREAKDOWN OF DERIVATIVES CASES BY JURISDICTION
Exhibit 8 furnishes a breakdown of federal derivatives litigation
between 2001 and 2009 by federal circuit. The Second Circuit, which
includes the state of New York, had the most cases filed during the
2001-2009 period. Of the 238 cases, eighty-four were filed in the
Second Circuit, which accounted for more than one-third of all cases.
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Exhibit 8
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Jurisdiction

Circuit

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

1

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

0

3

2

4

8

8

5

5

14

8

9

23

84

3

0

0

0

1

4

5

1

3

3

17

4

1

2

0

0

0

5

1

0

4

13

5

0

1

0

1

4

3

3

0

3

15

6

1

0

0

0

3

2

3

1

4

14

7

2

1

1

3

0

1

3

5

8

24

8

1

1

0

0

1

4

0

1

0

8

9

1

0

2

1

1

4

5

5

4

23

10

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

3

0

4

11

3

5

2

3

2

7

3

6

2

33

Total

13

18

13

14

20

48

27

34

51

238

This high proportion of cases in the Second Circuit is not surprising
because securities and derivatives contracts typically specify New York
law, and the major securities dealers are based in New York City. The
Second Circuit remained the dominant jurisdiction for derivativesrelated litigation each year during the nine-year period.
C. CASES BY TYPE OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENT
Exhibit 9 furnishes a breakdown of derivatives cases according to
the type of derivative instrument that is the subject of the litigation.
Options are the most common derivative instrument referenced in cases
filed between 2001 and 2009, accounting for 46% of all the cases.
Futures and forwards were the next most frequently cited instruments,
representing 24% of all the derivatives-related litigation, followed by
swaps with 18%. The number of options cases has remained high year
after year. In 2009, options-related disputes were most common with
fifteen filings, followed by futures and forwards with thirteen and eleven
related to swaps. As noted earlier, the complexity of option contracts,
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the apparent opportunity for large returns, and the lack of market prices
for over-the-counter options combine to make these instruments ripe for
fraud in the hands of disreputable promoters.
Exhibit 9
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Type of Derivative

Derivative
Instrument

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

CDO

0

0

2

2

0

2

0

1

8

15

Credit Default Swaps

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

2

6

12

Other Swaps

1

2

4

2

2

8

2

8

5

34

Options

6

8

4

5

13

33

15

17

15

116

MBS
(CMO, IO, PO, etc)

2

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

6

9

Other Structured

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

3

Repo

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

5

Futures/Forwards

4

7

4

6

6

6

8

6

13

60

Total

14

19

14

15

21

51

27

37

56

254

The high numbers of options cases between 2005 and 2009 were
due to a significant increase in litigation alleging fraud. The number of
cases alleging fraud jumped to thirty-three in 2006 from just five in the
immediately preceding four-year period. Most of these cases involved
investment advisors allegedly misleading investors about the
profitability of investment strategies utilizing options and misrepresenting potential investment results. Futures and forwards accounted for
more derivatives cases than options between 1994 and 2000 because
there were more cases involving commodities in that period.
Commodities forwards and futures were involved in a high percentage
of cases, especially CFTC enforcement actions. 57 Between 2001 and
2009, the mix of cases has shifted toward a higher percentage of stock
options and currency options cases.
There were only twelve cases involving credit default swaps.
However, these instruments are among the newer derivatives, and their
use has rapidly grown. 58 There were six credit default swap cases filed
57. Finnerty & Brown, supra note 6, at 149-51.
58. CDS contracts were developed in the mid-1990s, which makes them newer
than financial forwards and futures, options, and interest rate and currency swaps.
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in 2009 alone. The depth and severity of the current credit crisis
suggests that the number of credit derivative cases will increase within
the next few years.
Exhibit 10 provides an overall breakdown of cases by derivative
type for the nine-year period. The current economic crisis started when
the mortgage-backed securities market suffered a meltdown in 2007.
Securities dealers had aggressively securitized subprime mortgages and
so-called Alt-A mortgages, which lenders extended based on minimal
documentation, which were thus ripe for fraud. Many of these
securitizations have exhibited very high default rates. 59 There were just
nine cases involving mortgage-backed securities filed between 2001 and
2009. We expect that the mix of cases will shift toward CDS, CDO, and
MBS over the next few years.
Exhibit 10
Overall Breakdown of Cases by Type of Derivatives

D. CASES BY TYPE OF UNDERLYING ASSET
Exhibit 11 describes the mix of derivatives cases between 2001 and
2009 based on the type of underlying asset. 60 The most frequently
referenced underlying asset is foreign exchange, which accounted for
31% of all the cases filed during the 2001-2009 period. Currency
derivatives have been the source of some high-profile disputes. 61 These
59.
60.
Exhibit
asset.
61.

See Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 31, 2009).
The number of underlying instruments exceeds the number of cases reported in
9 because some derivatives cases reference more than one type of underlying
See, e.g., De Kwiatsowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1295-97 (2d
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cases often involve either hedges that failed to perform as expected or
currency speculation that resulted in unexpected losses that the
speculator sought to void.
Ranking second, commodities were referenced in forty-nine cases,
which represented 19% of all derivatives litigation. Cases involving
currencies or commodities often allege fraud, and more specifically, the
allegation that the securities dealer or the promoter misrepresented the
trading strategies and/or overstated his investment results when he
solicited funds from investors. 62
Exhibit 11
Overall Breakdown of Cases by Type of Underlying

Bonds and equities were the next most common underlying
instrument, each accounting for 13% of all the cases filed. Interest rates
ranked next with 10% of the cases.
Exhibit 12 provides a breakdown of cases by type of underlying
asset during the nine-year period. The number of cases referencing
bonds was evenly spread, averaging three per year, from 2001 to 2008,
before jumping to eleven in 2009. Commodity and currency-related
derivatives litigation jumped significantly to a peak in 2006 before
tapering off in 2007 and 2008. There were only three cases referencing
Cir. 2002).
62. See CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: 1996 YEARBOOK, Ch.
4 (CIBC Wood Gundy 1996); see also CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL
RISK: 1997 YEARBOOK, Ch. 4 (CIBC Wood Gundy 1997).
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mortgages from 2001 to 2008 but the number of such cases increased to
nine in 2009. This trend is likely to continue over the next few years
because of the lingering effects of the 2007 subprime mortgage debacle.
Exhibit 12
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Type of Underlying
Underlying Asset

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

Bond

3

3

1

2

0

7

4

4

11

35

Equity

3

3

1

2

2

7

7

3

7

35

Interest Rate

1

1

1

1

2

7

2

7

3

25

Currency

0

5

5

5

11

22

14

11

8

81

Commodity

5

5

2

3

3

10

3

7

11

49

Loan

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

2

6

Mortgages

2

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

9

12

CDO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

10

11

Swaps

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

3

Volatility

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

ABS/MBS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

3

Total

15

18

11

14

18

55

30

34

67

262

Exhibit 13 provides a longer-term perspective on the mix of cases
based on the relationship between the type of derivative instrument and
the nature of the underlying asset. 63

63. See Finnerty & Brown, supra note 6, at 134-36 (overview of derivative-related
cases between 1994 and 2000).
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Exhibit 13
Number of Cases by Type of Derivative and Underlying Asset:
1994 to 2009

Cases involving options on stocks or currencies and cases involving
commodities forward or futures contracts occur in large numbers
throughout the sixteen-year period. Options are complex instruments
that entail leverage. When losses occur, this leverage tends to magnify
them. The larger losses in turn make it more likely that the aggrieved
party will litigate if the dispute cannot be resolved amicably.
E. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
Numerous cases in the period 2001-2009 revolved around the use
of foreign currency options to allegedly create illegal tax shelters. 64 The
typical transaction involved a bank or securities firm, a law firm, an
accounting firm, and a wealthy individual seeking to avoid a large
capital gains tax liability, for example, on the gain realized when shares
of common stock of a previously closely held firm were sold in a public
offering or a change-of-control transaction. The tax shelter entailed
structuring a sequence of transactions designed to manufacture a large
loss for income tax purposes, usually by exploiting a perceived loophole
in the partnership tax rules. The bank or securities firm offered the
derivative, the accounting firm structured the erstwhile tax shelter, and
the law firm opined on the legality of the package.
These structures often entailed buying and selling foreign exchange
call options (or put options) with roughly the same strike price. The
64. Alan L. Tucker, Son of BOSS, 15 J. of Derivatives 74, 82-83 (2008).
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nearly identical strike prices meant that the option holder had very little
risk and very little opportunity for profit. These options were transferred
to a partnership soon after purchase. The tax basis of the partnership
was increased by the amount paid to purchase the long option position,
while not accounting for the obligation associated with the short option
position. The partnership was subsequently dissolved, and the assets
were distributed to the partners who reported a large capital loss for
income tax purposes owing to their high tax basis in the partnership.
Some of the tax structures 65 that fit this general form were marketed under the names BOSS (Bond and Options Sales Strategy), COBRA (Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives), FLIP (Foreign Leveraged
Investment Program), OPS (Option Participation Strategy), HOMER,
BART etc. 66
In a number of related cases, such as Denney v. BDO Seidman and
Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, et al., the plaintiff taxpayers sued
defendants Deutsche Bank, law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist, and tax and
accounting experts BDO Seidman (“BDO”). 67 The tax strategy was
developed by Jenkens & Gilchrist, and BDO marketed it to high-networth individuals. Jenkens & Gilchrist wrote the legal opinions
asserting the legality of the tax shelter. 68 Plaintiffs opened accounts
with Deutsche Bank to execute the option transactions based on BDO’s
recommendation, Deutsche Bank’s assurances regarding the strategy,
and Jenkens & Gilchrist’s tax opinion. 69
In August 2000, the IRS published a notice stating that the COBRA
structure was illegal because it lacked economic substance and warning
that it had previously taken the position that similar tax shelters were not
valid in another circular issued in December 1999. 70 Nonetheless,
Jenkens & Gilchrist apparently continued to vouch for the legality of
such deals. 71 The plaintiffs used the COBRA strategy to reduce their
65. See The Johnson Law Firm, Tax Shelter Abuse: Complaints and Lawsuits,
http://www.taxsheltervictimslawfirm.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing
various forms of tax shelters).
66. See Tax-News.com, Leroy Baker, Tax Shelter Probe Sinks Esteemed US Law
Firm, http://www.tax-news.com/archive/story/Tax_Shelter_Probe_Sinks_Esteemed_US
_Law_Firm_xxxx26854.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
67. Denney v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 412 F. 3d 58 (2d Cir. 2005); Denney v.
Jenkins & Gilchrist, 412 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
68. BDO Seidman, 412 F.3d 58.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F. Supp. 2d 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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income taxes for 1999, 2000 and 2001. 72 Upon receiving notices from
both the New York State Revenue Department and the IRS stating that
their income tax returns had been selected for audit, the plaintiffs sued
the defendants alleging several violations of the law, including unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duties, and negligent misrepresentation. 73
Plaintiffs had allegedly entered into a consulting agreement with
BDO to participate in the COBRA tax arrangement.74 The district court
held that the consulting agreement was just a “trick” to prevent the other
parties from understanding the true nature of the relationship between
the plaintiffs and BDO, and therefore was mutually fraudulent and
void. 75 However, the court of appeals overturned the district court’s
decision that the contracts were mutually fraudulent. 76
Numerous other cases involved commodity futures or forward
contracts. For example, Olympic Natural Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley
Capital Group, Inc. is a commodities dispute concerning settlement
payments owed under natural gas contracts by a firm that filed for
bankruptcy protection. 77 The bankruptcy trustee sought avoidance of
payments made by the Olympic Natural Gas Co. and Olympic Gas
Marketing, Inc. (collectively, “Olympic”) to Morgan Stanley Capital
Group (“Morgan Stanley”). The trustee alleged that the payments could
be avoided as preferential or fraudulent transfers. Morgan Stanley
argued that the contracts in question were forward contracts, that the
monies Olympic owed were “settlement payments” which it made to
Morgan Stanley acting as a forward contract merchant, and that the
payments were therefore exempt from avoidance attack.
There were two crucial issues before the court. 78 First, was Morgan
Stanley a forward contract merchant? To settle that question, it was
necessary to determine whether the contracts Olympic had entered into
with Morgan Stanley were forward contracts. Second, it was necessary
72. Id. at 342-43.
73. See id. at 340, 342.
74. BDO Seidman, 412 F.3d at 61-62 (citing Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F.
Supp. 2d 338, 341 & 343-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). However, the BDO consulting agreement did not mention the COBRA strategy by name. 412 F. Supp. 2d at 301 & n.49.
75. BDO Seidman, 412 F.3d at 63 (citing Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 340 F.
Supp. 2d 338, 346-47 & n.9).
76. Id. at 60-61.
77. In re Olympic Nat. Gas Co. v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 294 F.3d 737,
739-40 (5th Cir. 2002).
78. Id. at 740.
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to determine whether the cash transfers were settlement payments under
these contracts.
The disputed contracts outlined the terms of sales and purchases of
natural gas between Olympic and Morgan Stanley. Each month the
counterparties entered into a number of transactions with a single
settlement date. The trustee claimed that the bankruptcy code divided
the commodity world into three parts: (1) exchange-traded futures
contracts; (2) off-exchange over-the-counter forwards; and (3) ordinary
commodity contracts (commercial contracts for the supply of goods with
a future delivery date). 79 The trustee alleged that Olympic’s agreements
with Morgan Stanley fell into the third category. 80 Morgan Stanley
argued that the last two categories are the same and that the disputed
contracts are forward contracts. 81
The bankruptcy court and the district court sided with Morgan
Stanley in determining that the commodity world was divided only into
exchange-traded and over-the-counter markets and that the contracts in
question were indeed valid forward contracts. 82 The courts ruled that
Morgan Stanley was acting as a forward contract merchant when it
entered into the disputed contracts and that the transfers in question were
covered by the definition of settlement payments to close a forward
contract. The appellate court upheld these rulings. Therefore,
Olympic’s payments to Morgan Stanley could not be avoided under the
bankruptcy code. 83

VI. CREDIT DERIVATIVES CASES
This section discusses recent noteworthy credit derivatives cases.
We believe that the current economic crisis is likely to spawn significant
credit derivatives litigation because the credit market meltdown exposed
flaws in many of these instruments and generated large losses that are
likely to lead to litigation.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 740-41.
Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 742.
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A. NATURE OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES CASES
Credit derivatives cases have assumed some prominence in the
context of the current economic crisis. This crisis is due, at least in part,
to a substantial recalibration of credit risk by capital market participants.
CDS played a central role in this process. The CDS market grew rapidly
beginning in 2000. The notional value outstanding of CDS contracts
was U.S. $57.4 trillion at the end of June 2008. 84 Similarly, CDO
issuance expanded on the premise that it helped to better match issuance
with investor risk tolerances.
As reported in Exhibit 9, a total of twenty-seven credit-related derivatives cases, fifteen involving CDOs and twelve involving CDS, were
filed in the federal courts between 2001 and 2009. Due to the steep
losses
experienced by many CDO investors, an increase in litigation alleging
misrepresentation of CDO investment risks can be expected in the
future.
B. REPRESENTATIVE CREDIT DERIVATIVES CASES
Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Cooperative v. John Hancock Life
Insurance Company is a complex dispute involving CDS contracts that
resulted directly from the current credit crisis. 85 In 2002, plaintiff
Hoosier Energy entered into a sale-in-lease-out (“SILO”) transaction
involving an electric generating plant. 86 Hoosier Energy leased certain
assets at its Merom power plant to John Hancock Life Insurance (“John
Hancock”) for a term of sixty-three years (which exceeded their useful
life) in return for a one-time payment of $300 million. 87 John Hancock
immediately leased these assets back to Hoosier Energy for a term of
thirty years in return for periodic lease payments. Hoosier Energy
retained close to $20 million of the money received for the initial leaseout and deposited $278 million with various Ambac entities, which
committed to make regular lease payments on Hoosier Energy’s behalf
84. Bank for Int'l Settlements, Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC)
Derivatives, BIS Q. REV. at A103 tbl. 19 (Dec. 2009) (statistical annex), available at
http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf.
85. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F.
Supp. 2d 919 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
86. Id. at 922.
87. Id.
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to John Hancock. 88
The SILO transaction was designed to allow John Hancock to claim
to be the “owner” of the plant for tax purposes. 89 John Hancock would
then be able to claim tens of millions of dollars of tax deductions, which
Hoosier Energy could not use, because as an electricity cooperative, it
operated near break-even in selling electricity to its members. However,
Hoosier Energy made additional payments to Ambac entities, which
made it virtually certain that Hoosier Energy would retain control of the
Merom plant. 90 The IRS had begun disallowing income tax deductions
to participants in SILO transactions around the time of the Hoosier
Energy transaction. 91 The transaction allegedly lacked economic
substance because Hoosier Energy would remain in control of the plant,
and John Hancock would not have the rights, risks, and responsibilities
normally associated with asset ownership. 92
As a part of the transaction, Hoosier Energy was required to
provide John Hancock with a CDS contract from Ambac to provide
further assurances of timely lease payments. The CDS was intended to
protect John Hancock if Hoosier Energy defaulted under the lease. If
Hoosier Energy defaulted, John Hancock could demand a termination
payment from Ambac. Ambac, in turn, purchased a closely matching
CDS from Hoosier Energy, which would pay off if Hoosier Energy
defaulted under the lease. 93
John Hancock sought further protection by requiring that the party
providing the CDS should have a credit rating no lower than “AA”.
Consequently, if Ambac’s rating dropped below “AA”, then Hoosier
Energy was obligated to replace Ambac with another insurer satisfying
the “AA” requirement within sixty days. If Hoosier Energy failed to so,
John Hancock could declare an event of default and demand the
termination payment from Ambac, and Ambac could demand a
substantial payment from Hoosier Energy under the CDS. This
compensation would amount to approximately $121 million, as of the
end of November 2008. 94
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 923.
92. See id. at 924, 927-28.
93. Id. at 922.
94. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 1:08-cv1560-DFH-DML, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100353, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2008).
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Global credit woes, and in particular, the subprime mortgage crisis,
drove Ambac’s credit rating down to “Aa3” in June 2008. 95 The credit
crisis apparently made it impossible for Hoosier Energy to find a
replacement for Ambac within the required sixty days. 96 Following a
fifty-day extension, Hoosier Energy had lined up a replacement for
Ambac but required an additional ninety days to close the transaction.97
John Hancock refused to grant any further extension, declared an event
of default, and demanded a $120 million termination payment from
Ambac. 98
The termination payment by Ambac to John Hancock would have
resulted in a similar obligation for Hoosier Energy, forcing it into
bankruptcy. 99 The district court concluded that the bankruptcy filing
would likely cause severe irreparable harm to Hoosier Energy. 100 In
addition, the court found that Hoosier Energy had a meritorious
argument that the CDS contracts were part of an allegedly abusive and
essentially illegal SILO transaction that was devoid of any economic
substance. 101 Last but not least, in the wake of the extraordinary credit
crisis, the court also found that it was reasonably likely that Hoosier
Energy would be able to assert temporary commercial impracticability
with respect to its obligation to arrange for another CDS counterparty
that met the “AA” threshold within the pre-agreed time interval, and that
it should be entitled to more time. 102 Based on these facts, the district
court granted Hoosier Energy’s motion for a preliminary injunction to
enjoin John Hancock and Ambac from asserting an event of default and
demanding any termination payments. 103
Merrill Lynch v. XL Capital Assurance is a case in which one credit
derivative (a CDS) referenced another credit derivative (a CDO),
highlighting the sort of complexities that are at the heart of the current
problems plaguing the credit markets. 104 Plaintiff, Merrill Lynch
95. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 588 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
96.
By June 2008, only three of the thirteen financial guarantors tracked by
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s had a rating of “AA” or better. Hoosier Energy Rural
Elec. Coop,. LEXIS 100353, at *9.
97. Id. at *11-*12.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *13-*16.
100. Id. at *13.
101. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 588 F. Supp. 2d at 926-28.
102. Id. at 930-32.
103. Id. at 935.
104. Merrill Lynch Int'l v. XL Capital Assurance, 564 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y.
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International (“MLI”), sued the bond insurer XL Capital Assurance Inc.
(“XLCA”) to enforce seven credit default swaps with a notional amount
of about $ 3.1 billion. The reference obligations for these swaps were
seven CDOs.
MLI owned both the A-1 and A-2 “super senior” tranches of the
CDOs in question, but purchased insurance from XLCA only on the A-2
tranche. 105 In general, the seller of protection in the CDS gets voting
rights only on the insured tranche, but in this case, XLCA obtained
exclusive “controlling class” rights on both tranches. 106 Subsequently,
MLI bought another CDS referencing the A-1 tranche of the same
CDOs. Subsequently, MLI bought six additional CDSs referencing the
same A-1 notes of six of the seven CDOs that were referenced in the
XCLA swaps. 107 XLCA learned that S&P listed MBIA as the bond
insurance provider for the six CDOs and that MBIA had instructed MLI
how to exercise certain Class A-1voting rights for the six CDOs. Based
on this information, XLCA decided to terminate the swaps alleging that
MLI had anticipatorily breached, or repudiated, six of the contracts by
entering into CDSs with another guarantor referencing the same
CDOs. 108 Additionally, XLCA tried to terminate a seventh CDS
because MLI had allegedly failed to adequately assure XLCA of its
intent to perform under this CDS contract. 109
The district court found that the contractual language qualified
MLI’s requirement to obey MBIA’s directions where these directions
might conflict with meeting its obligations under the XLCA swap
agreements. 110 Thus, XLCA was not justified in terminating the six
CDSs where MBIA was also an insurer. Also, the court found that
XLCA’s concerns about MLI’s possible nonperformance on the seventh
swap were not valid because they were premised on an incorrect
interpretation of MLI’s conduct on the other six CDS transactions. 111
2008).
105. Id. at 300.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 301.
108. Id. In general, the most senior class of CDO notes is the “controlling class.”
It has the right to direct the CDO trustee to institute legal proceedings, and in the event
of default, to terminate the collateral manager, accelerate note maturities, and order the
liquidation of the trust’s collateral.
109. Id. at 302.
110. Id. at 304.
111. Id. at 306.
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Consequently, the court ruled that XLCA’s termination notices did not
have any legal basis, and the CDS contracts remained in effect. 112

V. DERIVATIVES CASES BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS
This section provides a breakdown of derivatives actions based on
the nature of the allegations. We also describe some of the more
noteworthy cases.
A. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY TYPE OF ALLEGATION
Exhibit 14 shows the annual breakdown of derivatives-related
litigation based on the nature of the allegations. Fraud, including
securities fraud, was the prime allegation in derivatives litigation
between 2001 and 2009. Fraud was alleged in 138 cases. Breach of
contract was the next most frequent allegation; it was alleged in sixtyfive instances. The percentage of cases alleging fraud peaked at 80% in
2007, while the percentage alleging breach of contract reached a peak of
35% in 2002. Of course, many complaints involve multiple allegations.
The bulk of the options and futures cases surveyed involve alleged fraud
by investment advisors who were soliciting investments on the basis of
misrepresentations involving derivatives.

112. Id.
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Exhibit 14
Annual Breakdown of Cases by Type of Allegation
Allegation

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

Fraud

6

8

6

4

7

24

17

16

15

103

Securities Fraud

4

1

2

3

2

5

3

3

12

35

Civil Conspiracy

0

0

0

0

4

2

0

3

2

11

Breach of Contract

4

7

3

3

4

16

3

6

19

65

Breach of
Fiduciary Duty

1

2

1

0

4

2

1

5

14

30

Good faith and
Fair Dealing

0

1

0

0

2

5

0

1

3

12

Unjust Enrichment

0

0

0

0

5

1

0

1

7

14

Negligent
Misrepresentation

0

1

0

0

4

2

0

3

8

18

Negligence

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

1

4

8

Illegal Tax Shelter

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

3

4

8

Total

15

20

12

10

32

60

25

42

88

304

The high percentage of fraud cases is not surprising because
derivatives instruments are complex, and unscrupulous promoters often
misrepresent their capabilities to induce investors into entering into
transactions. This complexity facilitates their misuse because investors
would be less likely to accept the misrepresentations if the contracts
were simpler and therefore more easily understood.
Exhibit 15 provides an overall breakdown of derivatives-related
cases during the nine-year period based on the type of allegation. Fraud,
at least partly, accounts for 34% of the cases and a total of 45% when
securities fraud is included. Breach of contract at least partly accounts
for 21%. The interest rate-swap and credit derivative disputes during
this period were dominated by alleged breach of contract and other
contractual issues, such as disagreements about the interpretation of
covenants (Metropolitan West Asset Management v. Shenkman Capital
Management, which is detailed later in the article 113) and disputes
regarding termination payments (Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Cooperative v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company, 114 which was
113. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17003 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
114. No. 1:08-cv-1560-DFH-DML, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100353 (S.D. Ind. Dec.
11, 2008).
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discussed earlier in the article, and In re: Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., 115 which is detailed later in the article). Payment disputes
under interest rate swap contracts are often framed as breach of contract
cases in which one party disputes the other party’s payment calculation.
Exhibit 15
Overall Breakdown of Cases by Type of Allegation

B. THE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME
The Madoff scandal provides a current example of how promoters
can invoke supposedly sophisticated options strategies to carry out a
fraudulent investment scheme. Bernard Madoff allegedly achieved
stellar investment performance by utilizing a sophisticated “split-strike
conversion strategy.” 116 This performance has been revealed to be
nothing more than a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme. His largest fund
reported consistently high returns with incredibly low volatility over
nearly two decades, which he attributed to his strategy of coupling an
investment in large cap stocks with the purchase and sale of S&P 100
Index options. 117 This “split-strike conversion strategy” investment
scheme involved (a) buying a portfolio of common stocks that were
supposed to replicate the performance of the S&P 100 Index plus (b)
buying out-of-the-money S&P 100 Index put options plus (c) selling

115. 399 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008).
116. Bernard & Boyle, supra note 7, at 2. See also Stephen Gandel, Wall Street’s
Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud, TIME, Dec. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1866154,00.html.
117. Gandel, supra note 116, at 2-3.
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out-of-the-money S&P 100 Index call options. 118 The put options are
supposed to protect the equity portfolio against downside risk. The
premium received from selling the call options is designed to pay for the
put options. Together they constitute a collar; however, referring to the
strategy as a “split-strike conversion strategy” sounds more sophisticated
than simply calling it a collar. As with any equity collar, the investor
forgoes some of the upside (above the call option’s strike price) to
eliminate some of the downside (below the put option’s strike price).
While this strategy will certainly decrease volatility as compared to a
strict buy-and-hold equity scheme, the rates of return claimed by
Madoff’s funds were improbably stable. 119
Exhibit 16 shows that one dollar invested in December 1990 with
the Fairfield Sentry Ltd. hedge fund, which was one of Madoff’s largest
feeder funds, would have grown almost linearly to about six dollars by
October 2008. Fairfield Sentry claimed an average annual return of
10.59% between December 1990 and October 2008 with a standard
deviation of just 2.45%. 120 This performance compares with a 9.64%
average annual return and a 14.28% standard deviation of the S&P 500
during the same period. 121 Investment managers calculate the Sharpe
ratio to express a portfolio’s rate of return in relation to the portfolio’s
risk. It equals the difference between the portfolio’s rate of return and
the return of a risk-free investment (i.e., the portion of the total return
that compensates for the portfolio’s risk) divided by the standard
deviation of the portfolio’s return (i.e., the portfolio’s risk). 122

118. Bernard & Boyle, supra note 7, at 2-3.
119. Id. at 3, 10.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id. at 4.
122. William Sharpe, The Sharpe Ratio, J. of PORTFOLIO MGMT., 1994, at 49-58.
The standard deviation of a portfolio’s rate of return is a standard measure of portfolio
risk in the investment management field.
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Exhibit 16
Value of $1 Invested in Fairfield Sentry: Dec. 1990 to Oct. 2008

Source: Bernard and Boyle (2009) 123
The higher the Sharpe ratio, the better is the strategy’s rate of return
in relation to its risk. Simulation results from strategies similar to those
purportedly employed by Madoff run on data for the S&P from
December 1990 to October 2008 indicate a best case annual Sharpe
Ratio of 0.326 as compared to the 2.47 Sharpe Ratio claimed by
Fairfield Sentry. 124
In other words, Fairfield claimed a Sharpe Ratio for Madoff’s
strategy that was nearly eight times what could reasonably be expected.
The returns Fairfield Sentry reported for Madoff’s strategy implied a
beta for the strategy of 0.06 and a correlation with the S&P 100 Index of
only 0.3, both of which are improbably low. 125
The obvious question is how could such a giant scheme continue
for so long without detection? Apparently, there were several
investment professionals whose warnings that the scheme was a massive
fraud went unheeded. 126 In view of the improbability of achieving the
123. Bernard & Boyle, supra note 7, at 18-19.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id. The Fairfield Sentry Ltd. hedge fund was one of the larger feeder funds for
the Madoff funds.
126. Gregory Zuckerman, Fees, Even Returns and Auditors All Raised Flags,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2008, at A7.
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claimed returns, there certainly appears to have been a regulatory failure.
In addition, we think that Madoff’s wrapping the investment strategy in
the cloak of a “nontraditional options strategy” gave it an aura of
sophistication, which together with the apparently stable high rates of
return, blinded investors to the possibility that it was all a sham.
C. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
CSX v. Children’s Investment Fund Management concerns the use
of equity total return swaps by The Children’s Investment Management
Fund (“TCI”), 3G Fund L.P., and 3G Capital Partners L.P. (“3G”) to
create synthetic securities. 127 They allegedly did this to evade the
reporting requirements of § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 128 CSX sued the defendants alleging a failure to file a 13(d)
statement in a timely manner disclosing the formation of a group of
investors whom it alleged had acted in concert to accumulate a large
position in CSX common shares. 129 Additionally, the complaint alleged
that the proxy statement did not disclose the group’s beneficial
ownership of shares referenced in the total return swaps. 130
TCI and 3G reportedly considered CSX to be poorly managed and
sought to profit from buying the company’s equity and improving
returns through shareholder activism. 131 Under the Williams Act, any
accumulation of shares above 5% of the shares outstanding and/or the
formation of groups for that purpose needs to be disclosed to the firm’s
shareholders. 132 TCI and 3G filed a proxy statement disclosing the
formation of a group and reiterating their intention to propose nominees
for election to the CSX board. 133 The group disclosed that it collectively
held 8.7% of the shares outstanding and also that it had additional
economic exposure to CSX common equity through total return swaps
tied to the return on CSX stock. Under the swaps, TCI and 3G would
make payments based on the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and
127. 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 521-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
128. Id. at 552.
129. Id. at 538.
130. CSX Corp., Information to Be Included in Statement Filed pursuant to Rule
13d-1(a) and Amendments thereto Filed pursuant to Rule 13d-2(a) (Form SC 13D), at
15, 17 (Dec. 19, 2007).
131. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 523, 530.
132. Id. at 538.
133. CSX Corp., supra note 130, at 14-15.
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receive payments based on the dividends plus price appreciation minus
price depreciation on a specified number of shares of CSX common
stock. Deutsche Bank, the swap counterparty, had beneficial ownership
of shares that was also disclosed in the proxy. 134
The district court observed that while total return swaps do not
directly confer beneficial ownership of the underlying assets (CSX
common stock), it was evident that TCI had used the derivative contracts
to avoid vesting of beneficial ownership and to evade the reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act. 135 In addition, the court
concluded that the group knew that the investment banks that were the
counterparties to the total return swaps would buy the underlying CSX
shares to hedge their derivative positions. Thus, the court considered
TCI to be the beneficial owner of the CSX shares bought by the swap
counterparties. TCI and 3G would receive the benefit of any
appreciation in CSX’s stock price through the total return swaps, as
though they had borrowed funds at LIBOR and purchased the shares
directly. The court also found that TCI and 3G had formed a group
earlier than they had disclosed. This ruling was based on the court’s
determination that group formation had to be viewed in the context of
either a formal or an informal agreement to act together to further a
common objective. 136
In Caiola v. Citibank, Caiola, who was an equity trading client of
Citibank, alleged securities fraud. 137 Caiola started trading equities in
the mid-1980s through Citibank Private Bank (“Citibank”). He mainly
traded Philip Morris (“PM”) common stock. His PM stock positions ran
into hundreds of thousands of shares and many millions of dollars, and
he became one of Citibank’s largest customers. 138 Caiola used put and
call options to create collars to hedge the price risks of his stock
holdings. The size of his trades grew to a level where the execution of
physical transactions in PM stock and options could impact market
prices and reveal his trading strategy to the market. To solve this
problem, Citibank proposed synthetic positions in shares and options to
Caiola in the form of equity swaps and cash-settled over-the-counter
options, respectively. 139 On Citibank’s advice, Caiola started trading
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
Id. at 517, 552.
Id. at 543, 552-53.
295 F.3d 312, 312 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315-16.
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total return swaps, which were coupled with synthetic options to limit
the trading risks. 140 Citibank promised Caiola that it would control its
own risks by delta hedging its net exposure to the synthetic equity and
options positions. 141 Hedging in this manner would be much cheaper
and have less market impact than executing physical trades for Caiola in
the physical market. 142
After Citibank’s parent merged with Travelers Group, Inc.,
Salomon Smith Barney (“SSB”) became involved in Caiola’s synthetic
trading. Caiola explained to Citibank that he wanted to continue his
current relationship with Citibank and that he did not want to become a
client of SSB. 143 He received assurances that his synthetic trading
would not be impacted by SSB’s involvement. However, starting in
November 1998, without disclosing what it had done to Caiola, Citibank
converted his portfolio from synthetic trading to physical trading, which
involved purchasing the PM stock for Caiola’s account. 144 In March
1999, SSB finally told Caiola that it was unwilling to bear the risks
emanating from synthetic trading. 145
Caiola discovered that Citibank had secretly and unilaterally
switched from synthetic transactions coupled with delta hedging to
simply executing massive physical trades for Caiola’s account as early
as November 1998. 146 As a result, Caiola then realized that he actually
owned hundreds of thousands of shares of PM stock, which were
unhedged and declining in value and which SSB was selling on his
behalf. 147 He wrote options to try to recoup his losses and to profit from
an anticipated eventual rebound in the share price. He alleged that this
strategy failed because Citibank unilaterally terminated the synthetic
trading, which cost him millions of dollars.
The district court ruled that Caiola’s synthetic transactions were not
“securities” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and dismissed
140. Id. at 316-17. Caiola’s transactions were structured as “paired equity swaps,”
which ensured that his synthetic option positions would always hedge his equity swaps.
This approach also simplified the dealer’s hedging strategies as compared to duplicating
Caiola’s stock and option positions in the physical market because Citibank only had to
hedge its net risk exposure.
141. Id. at 317.
142. See id. at 315-16.
143. Id. at 318.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 319.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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the lawsuit because the plaintiff was therefore not the purchaser or seller
of securities. 148 The appellate court overturned the district court’s
ruling. 149 It found that Caiola’s cash-settled over-the-counter options
were “securities.” 150 It also found that Caiola had successfully pled
securities fraud, ruling that once Citibank discussed its hedging strategy
with Caiola, it had a duty to disclose it completely and accurately. 151
The appellate decision is noteworthy because it applies the
economic reality doctrine to test whether a financial instrument is a
security. 152 The Supreme Court has stated that “in searching for the
meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ . . . the emphasis should be on
economic reality.” 153 The definition of security is interpreted so as to
“meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” 154 The economic
reality approach “permits the SEC and the courts sufficient flexibility to
ensure that those who market investments are not able to escape the
coverage of the Securities Acts by creating new instruments that would
not be covered by a more determinate definition.” 155
Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals International
Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co. concerns a dispute involving foreign
currency trading, interest rate swaps, and Thai baht-denominated
negotiable certificates of deposit (“CDs”). 156 Lehman Brothers sued
Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Company and its
parent China National Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corporation
(collectively, “Minmetals”) for breach of contract. Minmetals filed
several counterclaims, including fraud, negligence, negligent misrepre-

148. Id. at 319-20.
149. Id. at 331.
150. Options have been covered under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 since the 1934 Act was amended in 1982. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982). This provision covers
both exchange-traded options and over-the-counter options. The appellate court also
found that equity swaps are securities and are covered under Rule 10b-5 as a result of
the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000’s (CFMA) amendments to section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in December 2000. Commodities Futures
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
151. Caiola, 295 F. 3d at 331.
152. See id. at 325.
153. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975).
154. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
155. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990).
156. 179 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y 2001) [hereinafter Lehman Bros. 2001].
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sentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. 157
Hu Xiangdong (“Hu”), an employee of Minmetals, conducted cash
and derivatives trading with Lehman on margin. He lost substantial
amounts on foreign exchange trading and swap transactions in the wake
of steep rate hikes by the Fed in 1994. 158 Lehman issued margin calls
totaling more than $46 million. Hu agreed to a schedule of installment
payments to meet the margin calls. Lehman received just one payment
before Hu reneged on the rest of his commitments. Unable to reach Hu,
Lehman contacted his boss, Cao Yongfang, who informed Lehman that
the trading positions were unauthorized and refused to pay the amount
due. 159 According to Minmetals, state-owned companies in China
needed permission from the State Administration for Exchange Control
(“SAEC”) to conduct foreign exchange trading and swap trading.
Minmetals did not possess such a license and therefore, the contracts
were supposedly illegal under Chinese law. 160 Lehman claimed that
Chinese law was irrelevant since the parties had chosen Delaware law as
the governing law under the terms of the contract.
The district court determined that it would follow and enforce the
choice of law selection in the contractual documents. 161 The district
court found that the transactions indeed transcended public policy
boundaries in China and ruled that New York law does not ignore
illegality in China. 162 Enforceability based on New York law boiled
down to the question of whether Lehman was aware of the illegality
under Chinese law and whether the choice-of-law provision was chosen
to circumvent Chinese legal restrictions. Clearly, if Lehman had
knowledge of Chinese laws, it would have been mindful of the fact that
formal authorization was not possible for illegal acts. The court
determined that whether Lehman chose the governing law to circumvent
Chinese laws was a question of fact for a jury trial.
The court also determined that the defendant’s securities fraud
claims relating to the interest rate swaps were not valid because these
instruments are not securities under federal securities law. Additionally,
the court held that the foreign exchange trades also did not qualify as
157. Id. at 162.
158. Lehman Bros. Commer. Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals
Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 118, 132 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
159. Id. Hu confessed all of his unauthorized trading to Cao in July 1994.
160. Id. at 139.
161. Id. at 138.
162. Id.
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securities under § 10(b) and that the fraud claims with reference to those
transactions were not cognizable under state law. 163 Finally, the court
found that negotiable CDs are securities164 and that Lehman had failed
to disclose the sizable risks inherent in the CDs before the trades
occurred. 165 It ruled that whether securities fraud had occurred was a
question of fact for a jury trial. 166
R.A. Mackie & Co. et al. v. PetroCorp Inc. is a breach of contract
dispute between warrant holders of Southern Mineral Corporation
(“Southern Mineral”) and PetroCorp Inc. (“PC”), the corporate acquirer
of Southern Mineral. 167 Purchasers of Southern Mineral’s Series B
Perpetual Warrants brought suit against PC, as successor in interest,
alleging breach of, and tortious interference with, the warrant agreement.
They argued that the warrants were “perpetual” by their terms. 168 Under
the terms of the merger agreement, warrant holders could receive the
same merger consideration given to all other Southern Mineral
shareholders only if they exercised their warrants for Southern Mineral’s
stock prior to the merger closing date. Otherwise, the warrants would be
redeemable for fifty cents each, which represents the amount by which
Southern Mineral’s stock price in the merger ($4.71) exceeded the
warrant’s exercise price ($4.21). Both alternatives conflicted with the
perpetual nature of the warrants, and the plaintiffs claimed that the
implied forced redemption breached the contract terms of the warrants
by depriving them of the warrants’ remaining time value. 169
One of the conditions in the merger agreement was that 85% of the
outstanding warrants had to be exercised prior to the merger since PC
was not keen to inherit these potentially dilutive instruments. PC
proposed a merger structure that would ensure that no warrants would
163. Lehman Bros. 2001, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
164. Id. at 163-65. The court applied the three-part Howey test, which is the
classic test for determining whether an agreement is an “investment contract” within the
meaning of the Securities Acts. See All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams, 68 N.Y. 2d 81, 497
N.E.2d 33, 39 506 N.Y.S. 2d 10 (N.Y. 1986). The import of this ruling is that fully
insured conventional CDs are not securities but negotiable CDs that have “gaps” in the
protection afforded by bank regulations are securities.
165. Lehman Bros. 2001, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
166. Id.
167. 329 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
168. Id. at 482 (finding that the warrants could not be called, redeemed, or
extinguished; perpetual warrants are very unusual; warrants almost always have a fixed
expiration date).
169. Id. at 501-02.
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remain outstanding following the merger. 170 Warrant holders contended
that Southern Mineral knew of the perpetual nature of the contract but
still went ahead with PC’s demands in order to accomplish the
merger. 171
The district court ruled that PC did not uphold the warrant holders’
right to convert their warrants into the merger consideration at the time
of their choice and that the successor therefore interfered with their
rights under the agreement. 172 It found that the perpetual nature of the
warrants was breached by the Merger Agreement because the merger
was structured to extinguish the warrants and that the warrant holders
had their remaining time value taken away. 173 The court granted the
plaintiff damages based on the fair value of the warrants calculated by
applying the Black-Scholes-Merton model. 174 The court favored the
model price over the market price for the warrants in holding that the
prevailing market price was artificially depressed after the merger
announcement on December 22, 2000 due to the news that the warrants
would only be exchangeable for fifty cents each after the merger. 175
In Metropolitan West Asset Management v. Shenkman Capital
Management, Metropolitan West Asset Management (“MWAC”), a
subordinated note holder, sued Shenkman Capital Management
(“SCM”), the investment manager, and the trustee JPMorgan Chase
(“JPMC”) alleging breach of contract and gross negligence when the
trustee of a collateralized bond obligation (CBO) investment fund
(“Fund”) liquidated a pool of high-yield bonds. 176 The dispute focused
on the allegedly improper sale of certain distressed securities, which
lowered the collateral ratios of the Fund. Sometime after the sale, the
holders of the Class A Notes, the most senior class, voted to liquidate
the Fund in May 2003. The entire proceeds of the sale went to the Class
A Note owners. The plaintiff contended that since the sales of the
distressed securities did not comply with the indenture, the subsequent
liquidation without the consent of the subordinated note holders was
170. Id. at 491.
171. Id. at 504.
172. Id. at 509.
173. Id. at 501-02.
174. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option
Pricing, 4 BELL J. OF ECON. AND MGMT. SCI. 141 (1973).
175. Mackie, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 512-13.
176. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17003 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2005).
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improper. 177
The Fund started operation by issuing Class A, Class B, Class C,
and Income Notes. The cash from the note offering was to be used to
buy the collateral consisting largely of high yield and emerging market
debt. 178 Subject to certain conditions, the indenture permitted and/or
required SCM and JPMC to sell collateral considered “Credit Risk
Securities,” “Defaulted Securities,” and “Equity Securities.” 179 SCM
could direct JPMC to release from the lien and sell any Defaulted
Security, Equity Security, or Credit Risk Security. 180 A Credit Risk
Security (“CRS”) was defined as one that “in the Investment Manager’s
sole judgment, has a significant risk of declining in credit quality and,
with lapse of time, becoming a Defaulted Security.” 181 According to the
indenture, a Defaulted Security was defined as one “with respect to
which there has occurred and is continuing any default or event of
default under the related Underlying Instrument which entitles the
holders thereof, with the giving of notice or passage of time or both, to
accelerate the maturity of all or a portion of the principal amount of such
obligations.” 182 An Equity Security was defined as “any security that
does not provide for periodic payments of interest at a stated coupon rate
and repayment of principal at a stated maturity and any other security
that is not eligible for purchase by the Issuer as a Collateral Debt
Security.” 183 Collateral debt securities could be sold only during the
interest-only period, and after such a sale, the investment manager had
to exert reasonable efforts to purchase substitute securities with an
aggregate principal balance equivalent to the disposal proceeds within
twenty days. 184
The disputing parties agreed that about $8.5 million in face value of
CRS sold for $4 million in December 2002 did not comply with the
indenture. 185 But they disagreed on whether the sale of $66 million of
defaulted securities was proper. 186 The plaintiff argued that the
indenture required reasonable efforts on the part of the investment
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *19.
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manager to replace the sold defaulted security within a particular time
period. In addition, another clause subjected any purchases to certain
interest coverage tests. Reading the two points in tandem, the plaintiff
contended that securities could not be sold if the interest coverage tests
prohibited replenishment. However, the district court interpreted the
contract language to mean that defaulted securities could be sold even at
times when purchasing substitute securities was barred by the
indenture. 187
The critical issue before the district court concerned whether the
improper disposal of the $8.5 million of CRS was material to the
liquidation decision. 188 According to the indenture, if the aggregate face
value of all of the securities in the Fund’s portfolio fell short of 110% of
the aggregate face value of the outstanding Class A Notes, then Class A
Note holders could proceed to liquidate the Fund without the junior note
holders’ consent. The court held that the sale of CRS, even if
improperly executed, would have been immaterial to the senior note
holders’ decision to liquidate. 189 An additional $66 million of defaulted
securities were sold in 2002 and 2003. Even if the CRS had not been
disposed of, the portfolio had lost more value since December 2002
when the event of default had been declared. 190 The court found that by
March 2003, the Class A Note holders would have had the unilateral
right to force the Fund to liquidate, concluded that the improper sale of
the CRS did not cause any actual loss to the plaintiff, and dismissed the
claims against SCM in their entirety. 191
In re Plastech Engineered Products, Inc. is a bankruptcy case
involving complex contractual issues related to an interest rate swap that
a floating-rate borrower entered into to hedge its interest rate risk
exposure on its secured bank debt. 192 Plastech Engineered Products
(“Plastech”), an auto-parts supplier, filed for bankruptcy protection on
February 1, 2008. About one year before filing its Chapter 11 petition,
Plastech refinanced its floating-rate secured bank debt. 193 It entered into
a First Lien Term Loan Credit and Guarantee Agreement (“Credit
Agreement”), raising $265 million from a syndicate of banks with
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at *31.
Id. at *32-33.
Id. at *36.
Id. at *13, 35.
Id. at *39-42.
In re Plastech Eng'red Prods. Inc., 399 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008).
Id. at 4.
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Goldman Sachs serving as the lead arranger. Plastech granted the
lenders a first lien on its fixed assets under the Pledge and Security
Agreement (“Security Agreement”). A clause in the Credit Agreement
required the borrower to hedge the interest rate risk on this debt.
Plastech transacted a plain vanilla interest rate swap with Wachovia to
satisfy this requirement. Wachovia was neither a lender nor a party to
the Credit Agreement or the Security Agreement when it entered into the
swap. According to the terms of the swap agreement, Plastech’s
obligations to Wachovia were supposed to be secured claims ranking
pari passu with the claims of the first lien secured lenders under the
Credit Agreement. 194 When Plastech started experiencing financial
difficulties, Wachovia declared an event of default under the swap
agreement. Wachovia then terminated the swap prematurely and
demanded a swap termination payment amounting to about $22
million. 195
The bankruptcy court determined that the monies Plastech owed
Wachovia under the swap agreement would have qualified as a “First
Lien Term Loan Obligation” under the Security Agreement only if the
swap had been transacted with a lender under the Credit Agreement, that
is, provided the swap counterparty was a lender at the time it entered
into the swap agreement. 196 Since Wachovia was not a lender at the
time it entered into the swap agreement, the obligations pertaining to the
interest rate swap would not qualify as first lien-secured claims. 197 The
bankruptcy court sustained the objection of the first lien term lenders to
Wachovia’s entire secured claim except for $1 million, which emanated
from an assignment to Wachovia of $1 million of first lien term loan
debt owed under the Credit Agreement. 198

VI. CONCLUSIONS
Financial derivatives are more complex than stocks and bonds.
194. Id. at 5. Unfortunately for Wachovia, this provision of the swap agreement
was inconsistent with the terms of the Security Agreement, which would allow pari passu status under the latter agreement only if the swap counterparty was also a lender under the Credit Agreement at the time it entered into the swap, which Wachovia was not.
195. Id. at 7-8.
196. Id. at 17.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 19. Wachovia had purchased and taken an assignment of a $1 million
interest in the bank debt governed by the Credit Agreement.
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Consequently, they are harder to understand and more difficult to value.
In addition, these instruments can be used to gain leveraged exposure to
specific risks, which magnifies potential gains and losses. These factors
can combine to produce large losses for investors during periods of
heightened market volatility. Lawsuits are often quick to follow as
investors try to recoup their losses. In these court cases, investors often
allege that the risks associated with the investment strategy and/or the
profit potential were misrepresented by the investment advisor or that
the risks were not explained at all when the fund manager solicited their
funds. Fund managers also face breach of fiduciary duty claims for
allegedly inappropriately using derivatives or for using these “risky”
products in the first place. The rapid growth of the over-the-counter
derivatives markets has opened the door for a number of fraud and
breach-of-contract disputes because these markets do not provide
transparent pricing. In the early phases of product development,
financial engineers can fail to foresee and account for certain
eventualities, and unscrupulous promoters can exploit investors’ lack of
familiarity with the new instruments. In other cases, upon suffering
huge losses, counterparties may seek to avoid losses by exploiting
perceived contractual loopholes and refusing to pay, which inevitably
triggers a lawsuit when the amount of the disputed payment is material
to the other party.
The current financial crisis forcefully highlights an important
general principle: extremely rapid growth in the market for a new
security is often difficult to manage with potentially negative
consequences for all parties involved. Over the last few years, while
derivative product sophistication seemingly grew by leaps and bounds as
the CDO and CDS products evolved and gained market acceptance, the
risk management systems of banks, insurance companies, and brokerdealers and the oversight provided by their regulators failed to keep
pace. Risks were diffused throughout the financial system but the
amount of toxic assets on the balance sheets of regulated entities rose
sharply until finally the credit markets seized up, and investors pulled
back not only from the new markets but from all credit-sensitive markets
until they could regain confidence in their ability to calibrate credit risk.
The sheer magnitude of the financial sector write-downs suggests that
many of the complex new securities were not very well understood even
by those who structured them. The litigation that has ensued also
suggests that this lack of understanding was compounded by a
potentially severe agency problem that resulted from the failure of
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market agents to explain the riskiness of the new securities to investors,
or to alert investors to their inability to understand them.
With the credit crisis as a backdrop, the prognosis is for increased
derivatives litigation involving complex structured products, as parties
who believe they were damaged by the misuse or misrepresentation of
these products seek redress through the courts or through the arbitration
process. Other consequences include tighter regulatory oversight of the
banks and insurers participating in derivatives markets and greater
standardization of derivatives contracts with larger volumes transacted
on exchanges. However, these trends do not portend boom times for
structured product issuance anytime soon because market participants
are likely to view the next round of innovative products with greater
skepticism than they exhibited in the past - at least, one should hope so.
If the litigation process helps curb the excesses that have been evident in
the derivatives markets in recent years and encourages the proper use of
these instruments, then everyone can benefit from the resulting
improvement in market efficiency.

